[148 cont.]

175 643 were contemporaries of the Kungtaidji Bagatyre. A second proof can be added to this first one, namely, that in our table, as well as in the history, the son of Ishim is named Djangir.

In this way we find that Djadek, father of Shigai and grandfather of Ishim, lived with his brother Usiak toward the middle of the 16th century, that is, at the same time as the khan of Siberia, Kuchum, and his father, Murtaza. However, we do not know whether they were related nor whether they came from the same branch.

[14] Our knowledge does not go beyond Djadek and Usiak. In the middle of the last [18th] century, Tevkelev could not know the name of their father, because of the lapse of time since he had lived, and consequently it is still less possible to know it today.

175 643 554 From the questions we posed on this subject to Kazaks in the years 1820, 1821, and 1822, we learned only that their khans and sultans consider themselves the descendants of Chingis Khan. Most of the princes of upper Asia accord themselves this honor, and it is rarely without grounds. It is possible that many of the Kazak chiefs have a right to it, like many other Chingisids who received no other heritage from their strong and terrible ancestor but his name.

Abulgazi Baiadur proves that Kuchum, khan of Siberia, was descended from Sheibani, the grandson of Chingis, but Kuchum is known to have been a Kazak sultan, and therefore it is not surprising that other Kazak khans and sultans are also descended from Sheibani. Following [149] this first manuscript chart, if we go down from Ishim and Djangir, whose existence is known to us, to times closer to our own, we see that after Djangir comes his son, Khan Tiavka.

175 643 728 669 On hearing the name of this prince, the heart of every Kazak capable, through intelligence, of rising above his turbulent compatriots is filled with gratitude and veneration. He is the Lycurgus and Draco of the Kazak hordes. Once more he brought peace among them after the bloody dissensions. He stopped the

[149 cont.]

175 bloodshed caused for several years by the quarrels of certain
643 tribes among themselves. He compelled everyone to obey him
728 by his wisdom and equity. He caused the weak tribes to reunite
669 in order to resist the strong ones, and forced the latter to be peaceful. He gave them all the laws by which he judged them, and their memory is still preserved among the wisest Kazaks, but unfortunately they are not carried out (1).

1. See the article on the form of government in the statistical section /of this book/. [Not translated.]

175 643 In spite of all his services and his influence among the hordes, Tiavka apparently did not enjoy wide power over his people, and used prudence, experience, his connections, and his cleverness more than force. As leader of all the Kazaks, he lived in Turkestan, as did his father and grandfather. He chose three chiefs, whom he held dependent upon himself, to govern and watch over each particular horde. These were: Tiul, in the Great Horde, Kazbek in the Middle Horde, and Aitiak in the Little Horde.

175 631 173 We speak here of the division of the Kazak people into three hordes, without having said when and how this took place. Unfortunately, this event is a mystery to us, and we have no way of determining anything in this regard. We do not know how much to believe of a folk tradition which says that a powerful Kazak khan divided all his people among his three sons, and that those [150] given the eldest son were called the Great Horde, those to the second, the Middle Horde, and those to the youngest son, the Little Horde (1).

1. The Kazaks translate the word "horde" by iuz, which means "hundred" or "century." This is why they say ulu-iuz ("the great hundred"), urta-iuz ("the middle hundred"). However the word iuz also has other meanings in Turkic.

[150 cont.]
175 replied by [151] promising to be obedient to Russia in all things.
643 These relations had no sequel, however, for Prince Gagarin was
[662] recalled to Moscow shortly after, and Tiavka, the oldest and most cautious of the khans, died. His companions did not know enough to profit from this favorable situation. Instead of joining together again to ask Russia's protection against the Dzungars, they
[578] began to quarrel among themselves, and without any thought of the general welfare they continued in their usual calling, that is, they pillaged all their neighbors. And Russia, who had offered them help and protection, was not the last to suffer from
[726] this. Not content with their frequent raids across the borders of Siberia, in that same year, 1717, they moved in as far as Novo-Sheshminsk (in the Kazan guberniya), took the city, and laid it waste, and although they were driven out with great losses, they
[727] took away a large number of prisoners. This last expedition was made by the subjects of Khan Abulkhair (1). Kaip was afraid

1. See Rychkov's History of Orenburg /Istoriia Orenburgskaia/ and governor
[643] Nepluev's reports to the senate. Rychkov does not say who commanded the Kazaks in this expedition, but Nepluev says that it was Khan Abulkhair, who later became a subject of the Russian empire.

that it might be attributed to him and that he might be punished, although innocent, for the crime of his rival, so he sent a letter
[728] in 1718 to Peter I, in which he offered perpetual peace and alliance (2).

2. This letter, as well as the reply made to it by the governor of Kazan, is still preserved today /1832/ in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

175 This letter, however, did not stop the just vengeance of
721 the dwellers along the border, who were annoyed by the constant
726

[185 cont.]

and the ukase of February 6, 1738 addressed to Tatishchev, in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

punishment for their misdeeds, Abulkhair and his partisans were terrified to hear that Tatishchev was approaching from Orenburg with troops in the month of July, 1738. They believed that this army, which according to [186] rumor had been joined by several thousand Kalmuks, was coming to punish them, whereas Tatishchev, who was being escorted by the army, had no other purpose but to open meetings with the Khan and the principal Kazak sultans.

Wishing to assure themselves of his intentions, they sent Batyr Bukenbai, of whom we have already spoken and who was universally respected, to meet Tatishchev. The ostensible reason for his mission was to discover at what time Abulkhair should come to Orenburg and the number of sultans who should accompany him. The true reason was to reconnoiter the strength of the army and to find out if there were Kalmuks.

In spite of the fact that Bukenbai had calmed his compatriots on this subject, Abulkhair, who was conscious of his crimes, took a long time to decide to go to Orenburg. He finally arrived, and halted with his entire suite below the walls of the fortress, but he was afraid to surrender himself before Tatishchev, making the excuse that it was not befitting the person of a sovereign to make the first visit to a general. He held to this idea primarily because of the arguments of the elders who accompanied him. However Tevkelev, as his coreligionist and an old acquaintance, reassured him and made him decide to renounce his proud claim. The assurance that he was surrendering himself to the imperial camp and not to the State Councilor Tatishchev made him reduce his pretentions and go to Orenburg, which was then no more than an armed camp.

The interview was scheduled for the month of August, 1738.

In order to give it greater pomp, and thus to strike the fancy of the Asiatics, who love pageantry in all things, a major

[191 cont.]
Later, in imitation of their father, they undertook to satisfy demands which were beyond their power to fulfill. These were: to make restitution of all the merchandise taken from the caravans which were robbed near Orenburg and to surrender all the Russian prisoners who were among the hordes. Finally, they announced that their father requested a certain number of cannon for the war against the Khivans, and also that a city be built on the Syr /Darya River/, after having drawn a preliminary plan of the site for which it was destined. As a result of this request, Prince Urusov sent the geodetic specialist, Muravin, and the engineer, Nazimov, along the Syr and from there to Khiva, and they, after having made the first map of the part of the steppes of the Kazaks and the lands of Khiva that they had seen, returned to Russia a year after their return from this mission. The artillery was absolutely refused to Abulkhair on the pretext that there was very little in the forts built along the Ural.

Nurali and his brother Erali had not yet left when Abul Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde, who had long been awaited, was seen to arrive in Orenburg with the Sultan Ablai, accompanied by a large number of tribal chiefs, elders, and common people. At the time of their visit to Prince Urusov, they were received with the same honors as were shown to Abulkhair. However when they entered the tent, instead of delivering an address, each presented a letter whose content had the same sense as Abulkhair's speech, and for that reason we have not believed it appropriate to transcribe these letters here.

After the letters had been read to him by an interpreter, Prince Urusov responded with flattering remarks and promised them, in the name of Her Imperial Majesty, her good graces, assistance, and protection should they show themselves to be faithful subjects. Then he proposed to the Khan as well [192] as to the Sultan and the Kazaks of their suite that they swear the oath. Abul Mahmet and Ablai at once complied with the request of the head of the expedition, knelt on a golden rug, took off their headgear and swore their loyalty according to their customs. Then they kissed the Koran, placed it on their heads, and placed

[192 cont.]
their seal on the leaves on which the oath was written in lieu of signature. In imitation of them, 128 Kazak elders of the Middle Horde swore the oath in a neighboring tent, and the people took the oath outdoors. This ceremony was followed by a feast, the firing of artillery, etc.

On the following day the Khan, accompanied by Ablai, returned to Orenburg to discuss Kazak matters. During this meeting Prince Urusov particularly insisted that they should escort the caravans coming from Russia or returning there, that they should surrender the goods seized by the Great Horde from Muller's caravan, and that they should put an end to the disagreements existing between the Kazaks and the Volga Kalmuks. They were unable to satisfy this last request because they belonged to a people which was more accustomed to pillage than to obeying its chiefs. Furthermore, the Kalmuks had suffered more from the Little Horde, which was their closest neighbor. We will add, by way of proof, that in this same year, 1740, Abulkhair himself sent nearly 3,000 Kazaks to ravage the Kalmuk uluses.

It was impossible to satisfy the demand for escorts for the caravans. Ablai, who was more powerful than Abul Mahmet, could have assumed this obligation, but it was not to the advantage of the people or the chiefs, since no matter how high a price the escort received, it could not counterbalance the benefits accruing to the Kazaks from seizing the goods.

Two days after the first meeting with the chiefs of the Middle Horde, Prince Urusov invited them, together with the sons of Abulkhair, to come to see the maneuvers of the infantry and artillery. Abul Mahmet and Ablai admired the exercises [193] and especially the fireworks which were displayed in their honor. But in order to avoid meeting Abul Mahmet, Nurali and Erali not only failed to appear in response to the invitation which they had received, but left Orenburg the same day without taking leave of Prince Urusov. It was later learned that the real reason for this hasty departure was the fear of being kept as hostages in Russia at the instigation of Abul Mahmet.

The Khan and the sultans left Orenburg giving every sign of submission and devotion to the Russian government. But the events

[197 cont.]
in this way, and second, he could make his excuses to Galdan for not having sent him hostages, for he was certain that the border commander would not permit this.

This was exactly what happened. Abulkhair had scarcely arrived in Orenburg when Nepluev announced to the Dzungarian envoys that since the khan of the Little Horde was a subject of Russia he had no right to negotiate with foreign princes or to give them hostages. The same was stated for the Middle Horde and Khan Abul Mahmet. The Dzungars replied that the Kazaks were constantly making raids in their territories; that it was impossible to have any peace without taking hostages from them; and that besides they themselves had offered to satisfy this demand just as the Great Horde, which having become their vassal, not only gave hostages but also paid a tribute, and because of this there was perfect peace. The Dzungars were told once more that Russian subjects could neither make nor carry out such promises without the consent of their government. Nepluev himself assumed the burden of preventing any more Kazak raids into Dzungarian territory. It was then suggested to the deputies that they return home, but they answered that although they were thoroughly satisfied with their reception by Nepluev, his words were still not enough; for knowing the Kazaks intimately, who had deceived the Russians and the Dzungars alike with their promises of submission, they could expect nothing but pillage and robbery in the future, and that therefore they dared not return home without hostages. Finally, they said openly that they had been sent by their kungtaidji to Khan Abulkhair and not to the Russian government.

Nepluev and the Khan had considerable trouble in persuading them to leave with the promises they had been given, but they finally departed from Orenburg to go directly to their [198] country. Major Müller, who had been in command of the first Russian caravan which was pillaged by the Great Horde, was sent with these deputies, in order to persuade Galdan Tsyren more firmly that the Kazak hordes were vassals of Russia, and to deliver a letter to him from Nepluev.

[198 cont.]

×648 All this took place in August, 1742. At this same time Abulkhair, his son Erali, the famous Batyr Djanibek, several sultans and elders, and the common people who were then with him swore an oath of loyalty to Empress Elizabeth. On this occasion, after the feast, a company of grenadiers performed their rifle practice. The Dzungarian envoys had not yet gone, and Abulkhair did not fail to say to them that one could be secure under the protection of the Empress of Russia, who had such troops.

● [728] After the departure of the envoys, Nepluev did his best to show Abulkhair that neither the Little nor the Middle Hordes should attack the domains of Galdan Tsyren. Abulkhair seemed to yield to his admonitions and promised that in future his subjects would not renew their former raids.

Similar admonitions were still more needful to Abul Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde, who was even closer to the Dzungars and who had recently felt the cruelty with which they avenged their injuries. Nepluev was expecting him at Orenburg at this ×648 [662] time, and he was only a day's journey from there, but he turned on his tracks because of rumors spread by Abulkhair that he and his elders would be held as prisoners when they arrived on Russian territory. Hoping that the reason for Abul Mahmet's departure would never be known, Abulkhair asserted his own submission to Nepluev, which he set up against the supposed obstinacy of his rival, whom he sought every means of injuring. The motive of all these schemings of Abulkhair was not only to injure Abul Mahmet but also to carry out a plan which was quite difficult to accomplish. He wished to give [199] another son, Chingis, in exchange for his son Khodja Akhmet, who was then a hostage in Orenburg. [595] But Chingis was the son of a concubine and not of a khaness, and Nepluev, who was acting according to the instructions and views of his predecessors, could not receive Chingis in place of Sultan Khodja Akhmet. The Khan was so angry at this refusal that he [622] wished to leave immediately, but he soon calmed down and agreed to await the decision of the supreme authority on this matter.

The artful, hypocritical, ambitious, and violent nature of Abulkhair was diametrically opposed to the mildness and goodness

[209 cont.]

[643] [662] Blinded by his resentment, Abulkhair considered this punishment as a new offense against him. He sought every means to harm Russia, and requested the protection of Persia.

[584] His son Khodja Akhmet had been transferred from Petersburg to Kazan, where he had fallen in love with the daughter of a Tatar and asked for her hand in marriage. Abuljhair's impertinences had been so frequent and so serious, that one cannot admire enough the patience with which the court at St. Petersburg put up with it. In order to give this khan one more proof of its indulgence, both toward him and toward his people, Tevkelev, who, as we have said, professed the same religion as the Kazaks, was sent to Orenburg in 1747. Furthermore he had spent more than a year among them and had acquired general respect, and he knew their customs and habits and had always been a friend of Abulkhair's. He was charged with placating Abulkhair through his advice, of reconciling him with Governor Nepluev, and of returning his son Khodja Akhmet to him, but in exchange for another son born of a khaness.

Abulkhair's death, which took place soon after, prevents us from [210] saying what the consequences of his dealings with Tevkelev would have been. But at the opening of these conferences, Abulkhair showed himself disposed to reconciliation. During the summer of 1748, he arrived at the fortress of Orsk (1)

1. This was the name given to the old Orenburg, after the new one was founded on the site which it now occupies.

for an interview with his old friend, and he not only gave as hostage another legitimate son named Aichuvak, who later became a khan, in place of Khodja Akhmet, but he also added the children of some of his elders. Furthermore he promised to [728] deliver immediately all the Russian prisoners taken by his subjects, and promised in writing that the Little Horde would never attack [662] the borders. When he arrived at the horde, however, he secretly

[233 cont.]

the southern region of that river for their own safety. At the same time the border commanders were directed not to permit its crossing from either side, and guards were reinforced for this end.

The bloodshed diminished, but the hatred between the two peoples has continued to this day. Mutual reprisals from time to time have helped to maintain it.

These results could cause the Russian government to be accused of cruelty. But let us examine the circumstances: if one takes a glance at the geographical position of the military line and the region of Orenburg, one can see what sorts of people occupy it and its outlying areas. On the other hand, if one notes the small number of troops covering the Russian border, it will be granted that the measure taken by Nepluev was the only one which could save the region he governed, and perhaps most of the southeast part of Russia. The Kazaks who lived beyond the military line would not have been the only supporters of the Bashkirs. They could have joined the Tatars of Kazan, Orenburg, Simbirsk, and Penza, who lived in the interior of the empire, and even the Teptiars and Meshcheriaks, who because of the wise measures of the [234] Orenburg authorities served to punish the rebels instead of revolting. All these peoples profess the same religion, and with all of them recognizing Mohammed and seeing the Christians only as infidels (kashfyr /sic/), what could one expect from their joining together?

If these matters are considered impartially, one sees that Russia had to decide to sacrifice either the Bashkirs or the Russians. If she sacrificed the former in order to save the latter, this conduct cannot be deserving of any blame.

Khan Nurali as well as his two brothers, Erali and Aichuvak, did much to help the Orenburg authorities find the Bashkirs who had fled beyond the Ural River and to bring them back to the borders. In order to please Russia they not only fought the deserters, but also those Kazaks who defended them. Although this zeal was not entirely disinterested, still, since it was accompanied by other signs of being favorably disposed, the

[235 cont.]

Khan of having secret relations with the Orenburg authorities. As a result, in order not to confirm the opinions of his subjects on this idea, he asked that when he was sent reprimands for them in letters coming from Orenburg, they be sent for him also. Concerning known brigands, he said he could make them known in secret but could not deliver them, leaving the power of sending troops against them to the Russian government.

As a result the government resolved to increase Nurali's power and at the same time to devise a plan for punishing the Kazaks in such a way that they would feel at least once the power and the force of the empire. An order had already been given to draw a detailed map of the western part of the Kazak steppe, and the best means were already being sought for carrying on a campaign beyond the Ural. Everything foretold a terrible calamity for the Little Horde (2), when the Seven Years War opened between

2. See the ukase of June 10, 1756.

Russia and Prussia, and it was averted.

Nevertheless there was a great national assembly in the Little Horde in 1756, no doubt with the aim of discussing ways of averting the danger menacing them, and it opposed not only the demand of the Khan and his brothers to return the Russian prisoners and the Bashkir deserters, [236] but also undertook to help them. The Sultans Erali and Aichuvak pursued the interests of Russia with great warmth on this occasion.

At the beginning of 1757, Dunduk Dashi, deputy of the khan of the Volga Kalmuks, warned the governor of Astrakhan that all the Kazaks were intending to enter the Turkish possessions on the Kuban and that they had already requested permission from the Ottoman Porte through an embassy sent for this purpose. This news was difficult to believe. Nevertheless prudence demanded

[239 cont.]
x 648 [661] died, he was obliged to send another at once to take his place, but he delayed and thought of weak excuses, and finally the local [343] authority received an order not to force him. It was also ordered that sheds and enclosures be built near the Ural River for him and his brothers, at the expense of the crown, for the wintering of their animals. Finally the Khan and the most distinguished sultans received many gifts at this time.

● [728] In order to calm all the Kazaks in the north and to protect them from attacks which could have stopped them even during their preparations to march against the Chinese, the strictest prohibitions were repeated to prevent the Bashkirs from crossing the Ural River.

[343] Certain difficulties which arose in building the livestock enclosures for the Khan and the sultans, their constant requests that they be allowed to spend the winter in the steppes of Astrakhan, and the fear that this concession might bring about the destruction of the Volga Kalmuks, led the government to return, in 1759, to the idea of building a city at the mouth of the Emba. It was thought that even if the Khan and the Kazaks could not be persuaded to live there permanently, at least they would not refuse to spend the winter there in order to care for their studs and livestock. However this plan has remained [240] unrealized to this day, like the one of which we spoke above.

After Amursan's death and the cessation of the unpleasant relations which had taken place concerning him between the Russian and Chinese governments, Russia's preparations to repel an attack by the latter, as well as the aid promised by Khan Nurali and Sultan Ablai, became unnecessary. Nevertheless the Russian court continued to fear for a long time that the Kazaks might [167] withdraw across the borders into the ravaged lands of Dzungaria. Because of Ablai's ties with China and the efforts of the Chinese to draw him into their vicinity, the Middle Horde even seemed disposed to change its place of habitation. It was supposed that if it withdrew eastward, the Little Horde would also follow its example.

[571] Such an emigration could not harm Russia with regard to her security, for the Kazaks, after becoming her subjects, had

[241 cont.]
of Ablai that they be returned, and sent an army to support their demand (1). The appearance of this army threw terror into the

1. See the reports of the interpreter Gordeev in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg.

Middle Horde. They not only undertook to satisfy the desires of the Chinese government, but a large number of Bashkirs, Barabin Tatars, and Russian prisoners were surrendered on the Russian border.

Nevertheless Russia owed the return of these prisoners less to the terror inspired by the Chinese armies than to the efforts and power of Ablai, who, although he was a subject of two empires, sought for political reasons to prevent his people from making raids into Russia. In addition, this border opposite the Middle Horde was always much more secure than the military line along the Ural River.

Let us return now to the Little Horde, whose khan, together with [242] his brothers, seemed more devoted to Russia than Sultan Ablai.

The Little Horde had not ceased to pillage the settlements along the borders from the beginning of spring until the middle of the summer, because the Volga Kalmuks had carried off much of its livestock during the preceding winter and because the guard along the Ural prevented the Little Horde from going along the Volga to recover its losses. Perhaps this first reason was joined by a second, which was less important but could also have influenced the conduct of the guard. During the autumn of 1759, Khan Nurali had come to Orenburg with his brothers, and the governor who had replaced Nepluev treated them with scant courtesy and, what was even worse, failed to make them any presents. This irritated them to such an extent that they did not wish to take leave of him, and they steadfastly refused to comply with any of his requests.

[265 cont.]

begun by Ablai. But the Buruts, who were accustomed to constant fighting, were not easy to defeat. The Chinese also experienced the effects of their valor several times and sometimes were vanquished by them. Thus it is not surprising that Sultan Tyz, who rashly attacked them with a handful of men, was defeated and taken prisoner, and he emerged from prison only under humiliating conditions and after giving them the slaves which belonged to him.

The elder Berdy Khoja suffered still more from the Buruts (1). He ruled the part of the Middle Horde which

1. This same Berdy Khoja came to the fort of Semipalatinsk in the month of July, 1785 and imparted the information to the Russians which we have given here about Ablai's son and on the Buruts. This was published for the first time in Sibirskii Vestnik, Bk. III, 1820, and we have taken it from this source.

nomadized near the Chinese borders, and often fought against the savage Kirgiz, winning battles against them frequently. In 1785 he won quite an important victory over them, but it was his last. Acting as an auxiliary of the Chinese army, which was marching against them from the shores of the Ili, he advanced swiftly from the shores of the Ayaguz and gave them a terrible rebuff. Encouraged by his success he set out again with a small number of his men and halted on his arrival at the Jidisse /Djidis?/ to await reinforcements. The Buruts took advantage of his weakness and attacked him during the first night, defeating him and taking him prisoner. The unfortunate elder, in despair, knowing the customs of his enemies, could no longer hope for good luck in the future, and resolving to hasten his death, he killed one of the Buruts who was [266] leading him to the chief of the tribe. The others could not endure the idea of letting this act pass unpunished for an instant. They stopped on the way

[272 cont.]

×648 No one stopped to reflect on the possibility or impossibility of carrying out this measure, because the Orenburg administration had proposed it itself and must have the means of accomplishing it.

[177] Having received the approbation of the court, Baron Igelstrom at once began to introduce the new order of things.

His first step produced results which were in perfect harmony
×648 with the end to which he aspired.

646 Without the intermediary of the Khan, he sent solemn procla-
● 728 mations throughout the entire horde, in which, without speaking
668 of the Khan nor of the sultans, he invited the elders and the peo-
177 ple to form an assembly in order to come to an agreement on the means of maintaining order in the horde and living in obedience to the Russian government. He advised them to renounce brigandage and raids and to expect the pardon they deserved for their repentance or severe punishments for the crimes which had been disturbing public order. These proclamations almost completely destroyed the last vestiges of the weak power of the Khan. Many Kazaks who were followers of the Khan abandoned him and joined his enemies, and all together they formed a national assembly which did not contain one sultan, and where Batyr Syrym, of whom we have spoken, twice presided as chief.

×648 The confidence shown by the people in Syrym in this instance
646 is very common, and is in perfect harmony with the Kazak notions
728 of the greatness of spirit. But who would fail to be surprised at the consideration given in Orenburg to this [273] man who the year before had been the leader of a band of brigands, at whose head he had attacked Russian troops and forts?

All Syrym's actions showed that he was a man of vast intelligence but one unsatisfied, restless, and vindictive, and moreover, of an enterprising character rarely found among a half-savage people. After having distinguished himself among the bandits, he soon came to eminence in the council which had assembled to re-establish the general peace, as he believed that new and brilliant advantages lay in this for him. As he was an irreconcilable enemy of the Khan, not so much because of specific disputes with Nurali as of the longing he felt for the heriditary

[273 cont.]
privileges which the latter held by birth, Syrym proposed that the position of khan was unnecessary and sought to make up for his own lack of illustrious ancestors by personal merit. Under his influence the national assembly swore the oath of loyalty to the empress of Russia without the least opposition, promised to stop its raids, and to apply its efforts to maintain peace in the horde and to obey all the commands of the Russian government. But it demanded as a guarantee of Russia's protection, that Abulkhair's descendants, including Nurali himself, should forever lose the right to be khans of the Little Horde.

Can one fail to recognize Syrym's ambition in this demand? Nurali and his brothers were poor leaders because of their weakness, not because of their cruelty. Thus they could not have incurred the hatred of the entire horde to the point of forcing it to consider their removal from power as necessary to their peace. Then the government even went so far as to say that it was no longer up to it to change the course of affairs, because the idea of abolishing the position of khan had long since been adopted. Moreover, the peaceful inclinations of the national assembly and Syrym's clever actions seemed favorable to the re-establishment of calm within the horde.

[274] Actually, the year 1786 stood out among all other years, especially the two preceding, because of the calm which reigned during its span and the more frequent relations between the Russians and the Kazaks. It is true that there were also several disturbances springing from the abasement of all the sultans, especially the descendants of Abulkhair. Nevertheless this does not prevent our notice of the fact that the greatest exchanges of livestock (1) on the line took place in 1786 and 1787, and in the

1. See the table on the quantity of livestock exchanged by the Kazaks with the Russians from 1745 to 1820 that we have included in the statistical article [pp. 426 to 427, not translated].

[275 cont.]

X 648 Baron Igelstrom not only forgot Batyr Syrym's former actions but even took him under his special protection, chose him as the instrument of his operations, maintained a correspondence with him at once, and held conferences with him, as though he were the chargé d'affaires or the representative of the entire national [662 assembly. When the Khan was informed of these details, he wrote 152] that Syrym was a knave who was deceiving the government and that he had no thought of re-establishing good order but only considered his own interests. The Khan also said that he attributed his own opinions to the entire assembly and that in his heart he was a sworn enemy of Russia, etc. These accusations were vindicated by time, but coming from the lips of a weak and humiliated sovereign and under circumstances which explicitly belied his accusations, they could not appear true and were accordingly allowed to slip into oblivion. It is true that Nurali added certain unequivocal signs of his devotion to Russia, for at this time he [128] released several Russian prisoners whom he had brought to the horde, offered his children as hostages, and placed himself at the disposal of the government. But he was too late. His personal submission was no longer needed. What was wanted was the force of power or of genius, which alone was capable of acting upon the horde.

X 648 Syrym had already acquired this force by his intelligence,
643 his influence over the people, and by the protection of the border
661 authorities. Thus it appeared that he promised greater advantages than the Khan, who had shown nothing but weakness for 37 years. The fate of this unhappy prince deserves pity. Yet following the opinion he had formed of Nurali and the system which had been adopted, Baron Igelstrom no longer found it possible to keep him in the horde. Thus he asked permission to [276] have the Khan brought into Russia, and once he had been received (1),

1. By a rescript of the Empress of June 3, 1786.

[304 cont.]
565 and the Black bone. The White bone is made up only of khans and
611 their descendants, who have the title of sultans. /305] Zealous
643 Moslems also put in this class the khojas, or descendants of saints
[792] in the Moslem chronicle of saints (1). The name of Black bone

[114]

1. Timkovskii, in his Journey to Peking, gives approximately the same meaning to the word khoja. Klaproth, in his notes to the French translation of this work, opposes Timkovskii's opinion. As for me, I repeat what I have heard many times from Kazak lips.

is used not only for the common people but also for the elders and other chiefs who do not have a hereditary position.

According to this distinction, one says "here is a sultan of the pure white bone," because he is descended from a khan in both the male and female line, and "this man is of mixed white bone," because his mother is of common descent.

[554] Thus one finds among the Kazaks the hereditary distinctions to which so much value is attached in Europe. Savages know how to take pride in services rendered by others, as we do, and to claim privileges as a recompense for the merit of their ancestors.

565 We do not place the Telenguts, or servants of the khans (2),
567

● [728]

2. The Telenguts are of Mongol origin but were subjugated by the Kazaks and have adopted the language of their masters. See on this subject, Klaproth's note in his Magasin Asiatique, vol. I, p. 19.

in a special class, nor the kuls, or slaves. The former are accepted among the people and enjoy the same rights, while the latter are considered as chattel or merchandise and are not Kazaks. These are the Russian, Persian, Kalmuk, and other prisoners.